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The aim of the article is to revisit and reintroduce the social and religious significance 
of humour. The chapter will examine humour as a complex human action by focusing 
on the function thereof in everyday life. The discussion will be informed by examples 
of the value of humour for physical and mental health, politics and religion. Politics 
and religion serve among the most popular themes and sources for comedy today, 
especially in stand-up comedy. These examples will illustrate how humour enables 
people (individuals and communities) to cope with life by engaging them in an open-
ended process in which alternative perspectives and attitudes become possible. As a 
cultural and contextual human action, humour can also serve as social commentary 
on social challenges and, by doing so, raise social awareness about burning issues in 
society. Moreover, the discussion will especially highlight two aspects of humour, 
namely tension and paradox. It will argue that embracing humour as a hopeful attitude 
that unlocks alternative perspectives of viewing reality needs more attention, especially 
from a religious perspective. The final section will, therefore, consider the religious 
significance of humour by expounding on the relationship with faith and hope. 
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1. Introduction
In this chapter I outline different aspects of humour by discussing the 
origin of humour, as well as its communication function. This discussion 
is motivated by the fact that humour is understood to be a complex human 
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act that can have both a positive and negative impact. As a human act that 
plays out in everyday life, several examples are presented that point to the 
complexity of humour, but more importantly for this chapter, illuminate 
the value of humour for people in different spheres of life. After the social 
value of humour is established by these different examples, the relationship 
between the comic and tragic vision of life is introduced, underscoring the 
differences between the two. In the final section the religious significance 
of humour is discussed by exploring the connection with ethics and faith. 
Furthermore, the functioning of humour in the Bible with specific reference 
to the role of the fool as embodied in the ministry of Jesus, is emphasised. 
2. Origin and social function of humour
Since humour is the main focus of this chapter, a working definition of 
what it entails, is necessary. As with many other definitions, there is no 
definitive definition, but precisely because of the potential complexity 
surrounding the concept, the need for a working definition is even more 
pressing. Tavory (2014:275) describes humour as “…one of the most 
complex cultural accomplishments…”, and therefore hard to analyse. 
Therefore, any attempt to present a working definition must consider this 
complexity and try to bring to the fore the different facets and aspects that 
form part of the attitude and act of humour. 
Tavory (2014:277) presents a helpful summary of the theory of humour 
towards understanding humour as social and cultural act. Tension is an 
integral part of humour, and, even more important, is that this tension 
should not be resolved. “To make humour together is then to experience 
this tension collectively” (Tavory 2014:277). This implies that ambiguity and 
not clarity makes a situation humorous, because as soon as, for example, a 
joke is explained, it is not funny anymore. Humour is part of everyday life 
and as such provides insights into people’s experiences. Humour creates 
a platform where people, through shared experiences, can engage with a 
process of meaning making. Meaning making as part of humour is difficult 
to measure since what people find funny is not made explicit, but only 
experienced, which is often difficult to explain. 
Tapley (2006:423) argues very strongly that humour is social, stating that 
“Humour is fundamentally social”. Tapley (2006:425) also contends that 
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humour is individual as a personality or character trait. Individuals perform 
humour, acting as individual agents. This relationship between humour as 
communal and individual is not mutually exclusive but rather two sides of 
the same coin, signalling interrelatedness instead of separation. Humour 
could also be described as a cognitive experience during which redefining 
of reality takes place, of which laughter is often an external display (Meyer 
2000:311). 
Does humour serve the common good? What about the ethics of humour? 
Are certain rules needed to make humour a positive and constructive 
element of our everyday living? These are indeed valid questions to ask 
because there is enough evidence to suggest that humour can also be 
employed to cause harm and can contain important social elements like 
power. Martin et al. (2003:53) present a helpful summary of different 
individual uses of humour as part of communication. This summary 
also assists in providing a broader and more nuanced understanding of 
humour. The summary identifies four ways in which humour can be used:
1. Affiliative humour suggests people spontaneously amuse others 
and, by doing so, facilitate relationships with others, while reducing 
interpersonal tensions. 
2. Self-enhancing humour describes those who have a humorous outlook 
and are often amused by the incongruities of life.
3. Aggressive humour includes sarcasm, teasing and generally putting 
others down. This use of humour can potentially harm others. 
4. Self-defeating humour entails the use of humour in a manner that is 
self-destructive. In other words, funny things are said at one’s own 
expense. 
However, Martin et al. (2003:53) explain that although these different uses 
of humour can be identified, one should expect some degree of overlap. This 
implies that humour does not always neatly fit in one exclusive category.
Meyer (2000) presents another useful analysis of how humour functions, 
underscoring how the use of humour is not a linear process, but there 
are many factors that play a role in why something is humorous and is 
received as such. He argues that the communication function of humour 
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makes more sense if you have a basic understanding of the theories on the 
origin of humour (Meyer 2000:311). Communication is key in humour. I 
found both the theories on the origin and the communication function of 
humour helpful for this discussion. The theory on the origin of humour 
can be summarised in the following three ways:
Relief: This perspective focuses on the relief people experience as a result 
of humour. This means that when people experience humour, it can reduce 
stress.
Incongruity: The element of surprise as part of humour is the key focus 
of this theory. To be able to experience surprise, you need the cognitive 
ability to understand and recognise the reality, before you can notice the 
difference. 
Superiority: This theory notes that people laugh at others, be it outwardly 
or inwardly, whilst experiencing some kind of superiority and triumph. 
This can include hostile laughter as well as the use of humour as social 
correctives (Meyer 2000:312–314). 
The communication function of humour operates on a continuum 
starting with identification, followed by clarification, enforcement and 
identification on the other extreme. The value of humour is that it can build 
support when the communicator identifies with the audience, and by doing 
so, gains more creditability. A communicator can use humour to make 
short memorable statements that are easy to remember, thereby clarifying 
the message. Humour can also be used to enforce the message of the 
communicator through critique but still maintaining identification with 
the audience. Differentiation is when humour is utilised by communicators 
to contrast themselves with their opponents. This kind of humour is often 
used by politicians, creating alliances and distinctions at the same time 
(Meyer 2000:318–321). 
Jackson (2012) also makes a noteworthy contribution towards 
understanding the social psychological function of humour. The social 
function of humour answers the question: How does humour relate to 
reality? Jackson (2012: 23–25) highlights the paradoxical nature of humour 
when she explains that whilst humour draws people closer to each other 
by, for instance, laughing together at a joke, it draws boundaries between 
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those laughing together and those outside this circle. Humour can reveal 
ourselves to us, as well as an alternative reality different from the real 
reality. It is this alternative reality I would like to underscore, because this 
also highlights what is, but also what ought to be. Therefore, humour not 
only creates an opportunity to have a glimpse of that alternative reality, 
but also encourages action to move and work towards the alternative ideal 
reality. Play is another important element of humour. I don’t argue that 
humour is play, but rather that humour starts with play. Humour is more 
than play, but both are expressed through laughter (Tapley 2013:147–148). 
From this overview on the social functioning of humour, it is evident that 
humour can be utilised in different ways and does not necessarily always 
have a positive impact. Therefore, researchers like Tapley (2006) explicitly 
question the value of humour in their work, as it cannot be assumed. 
Tapley (2006:421) specifically pays attention to the work of Jean Harvey 
(1995) and John Morreall (1938) in which Harvey argues that there is no 
good in humour, whilst Morreall advocates for the good that is to be found 
in humour. In this interesting publication Tapley (2006:422) contrasts 
the two views, pointing out the main arguments of Harvey, that humour 
is a weapon that is used by the elite (powerful) to oppress others and to 
maintain power, whilst Morreall argues that humour entails an attitude 
of lightness and willingness to look differently at a situation. In his final 
analysis of this comparison Tapley (2006:431) concludes that joking is “… 
not inherently morally flawed. Joking like many other social practices and 
social constructs can be used or practised for good or bad”. 
3. Social value of humour
There is a significant body of research on the value of humour in several 
spheres of human existence. In the next section I provide examples of 
this by pointing out the areas in everyday life where humour is found 
to be of value. Kuiper (2012:480) argues for the positive contribution of 
humour from a positive psychological perspective. From this perspective, 
humour is viewed as a positive attribute, characterised by several strengths 
like gratitude and hope. This view is based on a nuanced understanding 
of humour, considering both its potential to be positive or negative, 
and therefore affiliative humour is singled out as more conducive to 
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contributing to resilience. Resilience is understood as the capacity to adapt 
and bounce back in the face of adversity (Kuiper 2004:485). According 
to Kuiper (2012:485) humour contributes to resilience because it makes a 
reinterpretation of a traumatic event possible or it can lead to enjoyment 
of a positive event. Tapley (2006:422) stresses the fact that humour gives us 
some objectivity to look at ourselves and a difficult situation. This means 
that humour helps to create distance that assists us to reinterpret a situation 
from more than one angle, providing balance that makes alternatives 
possible. This distance helps us to not only see other possible ways of 
looking at the situation but unlocks our potential instead of viewing the 
situation as static. In the words of Corrigan (1981:8) “All comedy celebrates 
humankind’s capacity to endure: it dramatizes the fact that no matter how 
many times we may be knocked down or fall short, we somehow manage to 
pull ourselves up and keep on going”. 
Booth-Butterfield et al. (2007:299) corroborate and state: “Humour helps 
us to cope with life”. Coping is understood as an intrapersonal process 
in which communication plays an important role. Booth-Butterfield et 
al. (2007:302) conducted a study examining the role of humour among 
health professionals with special reference to the difference between high 
and low humour individuals and how these differences in communication 
contribute to coping with stress and job satisfaction. Some of their main 
findings were that using humour leads to stress relief and increases job 
satisfaction across age and professional samples. People with a high humour 
orientation reported that they managed to solve problems and experience 
relief of tension, because they handled situations better in general. The 
outward focus, away from their own stressful situation, that humour 
provides, assists them to redirect their attention (Booth-Butterfield et al. 
2007:308). 
Cameron (2015) contends that humour is even valuable as a strategy of 
public engagement in order to promote social justice. He admits that 
humour has both practical and ethical risks and limits, but in the face 
of significant low levels of public engagements, it is a risk worth taking. 
The question that this research posed, was if humour could lead to critical 
thinking and social engagement. According to Cameron (2015:280) the 
main ethical objection to humour is against the superiority theory and 
functioning of humour, but in his view there has been a move since the 18th 
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century towards incongruity theory, which focuses more on the structure 
of a joke and to a lesser extent on the content. In his understanding the 
significance of the incongruity theory is that it allows humour to be 
ethical and generate ethical consequences. Conscious of the possibility 
and view that humour can be a weapon used by the powerful to oppress 
and marginalise, he argues there is enough evidence that humour can be 
utilised for the common good (Cameron 2015:281). Tapley (2006:426) so 
aptly explains: “There are people whose struggling and strife is made that 
much easier by the sense of humour. There are people who face oppression 
and poverty owning nothing but their character and spirit”. 
Davis et al. (2018:3900) are of the opinion that due to social media, 
participation in politics is made more accessible and therefore no longer 
performed by only the political elite, but “…everyday people join the 
‘experts’ to have their say”. Moreover, the use of social media has shaped 
the tone of political interaction and fostered new forms of political 
communication, encouraging playfulness as a distinctive mode of 
communication. This playful nature of political communication facilitated 
by social media platforms like Twitter, enhances political engagement by 
serving as entry point for participation by disempowered groups (Davis 
et al. 2018:3901). Social media platforms like Facebook, used by millions 
of people, have several pages that communicate jokes about politics and 
race to name a few. Race, for example, in a country like South Africa, is 
still, 25 years after the end of apartheid, a very sensitive and complex issue. 
However, when these otherwise complex and sensitive issues are framed 
and received as humorous, it is often experienced differently and can assist 
meaningful dialogue or just help people to laugh about things that they 
otherwise would not. 
In the next section of the paper I would like to turn to the religious value 
of humour by discussing the relationship between humour and tragedy, 
presenting examples of humour in the Bible, the intellectual and moral 
ethics that humour could foster, as well as the connection between humour 
and faith as a way of seeing. 
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4. Humour and tragedy
Jackson (2012:14) describes the relationship between comedy and tragedy 
as follows “Comedy began as tragedy’s younger relative, and the pair have 
remained close, joined in an inextricable relationship”. She qualifies this 
statement by saying that comedy was originally understood as one half and 
tragedy the other half. The formal, traditional understanding of comedy 
is dramatic performance, but this understanding has evolved to a much 
broader understanding of the term and the forms thereof. Morreall (1999) 
gives a helpful overview of the connection between religion, comedy, 
and humour. Although religions, comedy and tragedy all focus on the 
incongruities in life, the different responses of comedy and tragedy to these 
incongruities is of importance, because of how they impact on the vision 
for life. While tragedy can provoke emotions of anger, comedy, on the other 
hand, can provoke the opposite like amusement, and these differences are 
profound for how it impacts on how we view ourselves and life (Morreall 
1999:5). Comedy and tragedy share the belief that there are incongruities 
in life, but they inspire different responses towards life. Morreall (1999) 
succinctly describes the contrasting vision of tragedy and comedy in a way 
that I found valuable for this discussion because it corroborates with and 
confirms what was discussed earlier under the value of humour and also 
forms the basis of the religious value of humour. 
Morreall (1999:25) argues that comedy is characterised by disengagement 
with emotions and tragedy by emotional engagement. I wish to differ from 
him on this point because I think both require cognitive and emotional 
responses, although the outcomes of these elements are different. The 
cognitive functioning of humour stands out in Morreall’s (1999:22–31) 
comparison. I would like to demonstrate the contrast in terms of cognitive 
and psychological dimensions with Table 1, followed by a short explanation.
Tragic vision Comic vison 
Simple schemes Complex schemes 
Preference for familiar Seeking the unfamiliar
Uncritical thinking Critical thinking 
Convergent thinking Divergent thinking 
Low tolerance for ambiguity High tolerance for ambiguity 
Stubbornness Willingness to change
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Idealism Pragmatism
Finality Second change 
Seriousness Playfulness 
Table 1
I hope this table provides a helpful summary, demonstrating the main 
differences between the tragic and comic view of life as postulated by 
Morreall (1999) in an easy and accessible way. From this table it is evident 
that the outcomes of these two visions are at best opposites and therefore 
lead to different ways of looking at ourselves, others and the world. Whilst a 
person with a comic view of life is open to alternative views (the unfamiliar), 
utilising critical thinking and engaging with complex processes, the person 
with a tragic view of life often looks for a single answer or “truth” (simple) 
in a way that is known ( familiar) to him or her. 
5. Religious significance of humour
In the earlier discussion reference was made to the need for ethics for 
humour to be positive, not only for individuals, but also for the common 
good. Research that argues in favour of humour always points to the fact 
that humour can be used in different ways. However, it became evident 
throughout this chapter that the positive impact of humour seems to 
outshine the possible negative effect. Morreall (1999:151) postulates that 
humour as critical spirit is important for religion. Moreover, humour does 
not only support other virtues, but is a virtue itself. Morreall (1999:152–153) 
argues that humour promotes intellectual values like critical and complex 
thinking, and openness for the unknown, but also traditional moral values 
like humility and forgiveness. The distance created by humour is a creative 
one that makes room for alternative interpretation and meaning making. 
Furthermore, this experience and viewpoint provided by humour makes 
us more patient with our own shortcomings and those of others as we come 
closer to understanding that the reality, we are perceiving is complex, and 
so is truth.
McFadden (2004:16) unpacks the role of humour during aging and states 
that “Older adults experience a kind of double jeopardy of despair”. 
She explains that society views old age as a time of despair where life 
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is experienced as meaningless, but she has found that humour makes 
a significant contribution to turning this perception and experience 
around. She contends that humour reminds us of our capacity to triumph 
over suffering by assisting us to integrate different experiences of life in 
a way that gives meaning and hope (McFadden (2004:21). Important for 
this work is the fact that she understands humour as an expression of 
faith. Put differently, faith undergirds humour and therefore forms the 
basis of humour as the ultimate order that carries us in times of despair 
and brokenness. Faith, and not humour, is thus the ultimate in her 
understanding of the relationship between humour and faith (McFadden 
2004:16).
Berger (1969) also makes an interesting connection between play, humour 
and religion in his book: A Rumour of Angels. Berger (1969:70) argues 
that these are “… signals of transcendence within the empirically given 
human situation”. These signals point beyond this reality, in other words 
transcending the everyday known reality. Moreover, these signals also point 
to some kind of order that helps us to make sense and meaning amidst or 
despite the chaos of suffering and pain. This reality that transcends the 
empirical reality is described as religion facilitated by inductive faith that 
begins in the everyday experience of man. Berger (1969:75) explains: “By 
‘inductive faith’ I mean a religious process of thought that begins with the 
facts of human experience …” This kind of faith therefore does not rest on 
mysterious revelations, but on shared everyday living (Berger 1969:79). 
Berger (1969:76) identifies play and humour as two of these everyday 
experiences and acts that posit the ability to be signs of transcendence. 
The intent of play is joy, and it has the ability to help us to step out of time 
into another, from the temporary to eternity, by bracketing the temporal. 
Similarly, humour relativizes tragedy, implying that it can be overcome. 
Because play and humour have these abilities, Berger (1969:90) postulates 
that they can be viewed as religious vindication of joy. Hamman (2012:44) 
explains the theological significance of play is often overlooked in practical 
theology, because of its ambiguous and paradoxical nature. Despite this, 
he argues that “… play informs life in many ways and is central to being a 
happy and content person” (Hamman 2012:46). Moreover, playfulness also 
creates anticipation as part of a hopeful attitude. 
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The role of the fool or trickster is an integral part of comedy. Corrigan 
(1981:9) describes the fool as the character that has “…magical licence to 
strip us naked as he reflects the folly of all human endeavours. He can 
act free of law and order, seemingly independent of the constraints of 
space and time, and always untouched by the terrors of reality “. Hyers 
(1987) argues that there is divine comedy in the Bible because of the use 
of comedy throughout the Bible. Hyers (1987:1–2) notes that according to 
Paul’s preaching, the cross and God’s work in this world is foolishness. He 
motivates his argument of the Bible as divine comedy by pointing out how 
the motifs of divine foolishness overturn human wisdom and similarly 
motifs of divine weakness overcome human strength. This paradox 
runs through the Bible and signals the power of comedy to bring home 
the serious message of the gospel. It is, however, a feature of the biblical 
text that is often overlooked because many do not associate comedy and/
or foolishness with the Bible and therefore insist that it does not exist in 
scripture. 
Colleague Johan Cilliers is definitely not one of those who deny the comic 
nature and foolishness of scripture. On the contrary, he sees it quite clearly 
and is excited about the possibilities and hermeneutical key/s that it offers 
for reading and understanding scripture, which is of utmost importance in 
preaching, his area of specialisation. Moreover, for Cilliers this is more than 
an academic exercise, because in my relationship with him as colleague, he 
embodies something of this. He keeps telling me the same joke about my 
car over and over again, and I laugh every time, not to please him, but 
because it connects us in a special way. His life speaks of an attitude of 
looking at the bright side of life, not in a simplistic and superficial way, but 
because he believes there is an alternative perspective on life. 
In one of his many academic works, Preaching Fools: The Gospel as Rhetoric 
of Folly, he and Campbell (2012) present a thought-provoking and rich 
perspective on the foolishness of the cross and preaching. They focus on 
the function of humour and particularly the role of the fool in Jesus’s 
ministry. They describe the role of the fool as follows: “They break into 
our circled wagons and smelt down our iron theologies. They interrupt 
and unsettle, inviting us to move from one place to another”. I particularly 
agree with their argument that fools are agents of perspective (Campbell 
& Cilliers 2012:80) because it resonates with the description of the value of 
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humour earlier in this chapter, but also because of how they demonstrate 
the embodiment and expression thereof in the crucifixion and ministry 
of Jesus. In their view, Jesus played the fool, a radical liminal figure who 
was intentionally ambiguous in his teachings, creating liminal spaces 
where discernment is needed, and new perspectives are possible (2012:103). 
An outstanding example of how this played out in Jesus’s ministry is the 
example of the parable of the “Good Samaritan”. Jesus told this parable 
(Luke 10:25–37) in response to the question of a lawyer: “Who is my 
neighbour?” Jesus’s response was not expected by the crowd and especially 
the lawyer, as it turned his question around to say that the question is not 
who is your neighbour, but rather are you a neighbour? Moreover, this 
response was disruptive on a personal but also communal and cultural level, 
as it questioned the ways and customs of the day, laying the responsibility 
on individuals to rethink what they believe and how it impacts the lives of 
others.
A new, surprisingly unexpected perspective was offered in no time, before 
the lawyer could gather his own thoughts and present a counter argument. 
Instead he was challenged to rethink his question and especially the motives 
behind the question. The element of surprise is therefore outstanding in 
Jesus’s ministry and his embodiment of this ministry on the cross. His way 
of dealing with the continuous questions, which were actually a questioning 
of him and what he represented by the religious leaders of the day, left them 
speechless and gently forced them to think out of the box of religious laws 
and cultural practices that functioned very strongly, about power that can 
include and exclude. His responses were not only disturbingly surprising, 
but also pointed to the revelation of God’s love and forgiving heart for 
all humankind, something that was not part of their religious views and 
beliefs. And therefore, Jesus become their worst enemy, one they needed 
to kill as the only option to stop this radical message of inclusion and love 
for all. 
6. Conclusion
I would like to return to the function of humour as attitude and everyday 
act or practice that has the ability to create distance in order to present 
alternative perspectives. In the light of this, I would like to argue that 
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humour has a hermeneutical function in everyday life that points to or 
discloses a transcendent reality as also argued by Berger (1969). Therefore, 
I also found the argument of McFadden (2004:16) feasible that humour 
undergirds faith. I would like to argue that having a positive, humorous 
attitude towards life and the self, signals transcendence and takes people’s 
active participation in being people of faith seriously, but also their 
embodied experiences. Having said this, I don’t argue that we can be saved 
or come to faith by humour, but that humour can be an expression of such 
faith received by grace. Faith can also be understood as a way of seeing 
and is therefore hermeneutical (Brümmer 2010:1). Moreover, humour as 
expression of faith can also be understood as the language of hope, because 
it is not satisfied with common-sense answers and responses, but points to 
a transcendent reality not seen by the naked eye, yet it exists. Such vision 
has the potential to motivate people to act in accordance with this view of 
reality created by the eyes of faith, imaging a different reality and outcome. 
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